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DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION.
By Joseph L. Sax. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1971. Pp.
xix, 252. $6.95.
Defending the Environment is a strategy for depoliticizing admin-
istrative decision-making which the author argues is systematically
destroying such valuble natural resources as wetlands, forests and scenic
corridors. Since this is primarily a book concerning the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, the Forest Service, and the Department of Trans-
portation, rather than pollution control agencies, its general applicability
to the full range of environmental problems is limited. Professor Sax
has examined several major environmental controversies, such as land
fills and transportation project locations, and finds wide-scale mismanage-
ment of environmental resources on the part of administrative agencies
through a series of incremental decisions. His basic conclusion is that
in too many instances old-fashioned political pressures-the influence of
the wealthy and their elected representatives'-operate to insure the
continued development of our natural resources without regard to the
environmental impact of the activity, thereby foreclosing environmentally
preferable uses of the resource, primarily nondevelopment. Professor
Sax argues that mechanisms do not exist to allow citizens to hold
bureaucrats accountable for specific decisions where it is alleged that
environmental considerations were given insufficient weight.
Professor Sax's basic remedy is to increase the role of the courts
in adjudicating specific controversies in order to supplement the adminis-
trative process. Administrative agencies would continue to perform their
usual functions such as investigation, standard setting and specific
dispute management. Their role, however, would become more confined
than it is today by emphasizing policy formulation and long range
planning functions. Sole reliance on the traditional remedies to improve
the administrative process, such as increased public hearings at the
early stages of a decision and intergovernmental coordination, are rejected
as are other traditional substitutes for a reordering of priorities. These
1. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 56
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Sax]. The first chapter is a case study of a proposed land-
fill on the Potomac River across from Washington, D.C. Sax's purpose is to show that
even agencies which have an environmental mission cannot be consistently trusted to
reach the "correct" result. One excellent analysis of the response of mission agencies to
new information suggests a need to alter their resource management policies. See A.
SCHIFF, FIRE AND WATER: SCIENTIFIC HERESY IN THE FOREST SERVICE (1962).
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remedies are not satisfactory to Professor Sax because "none of them
gets to the heart of the matter-a fundamental realignment of power
' Therefore, to effectuate the necessary policy changes, independent,
outside forces-primarily citizen conservation groups-must be given
increased power to challenge decisions. Being a good lawyer, Professor
Sax finds the courts especially suited to the task. Judges "will spend
only a tiny fraction of their time and energy dealing with environmental
disputes. For this reason the process of judicial selection is not signi-
ficantly affected by anyone's estimate of a given judge's attitudes about
those issues."3 Courts do not control their agendas and thus there is no
struggle for priority.' This makes courts preferable to agencies, accord-
ing to Professor Sax, because internal agency opposition to a project is
often dropped when outside pressure is applied on the grounds that this is
not the time to fight for a basic principle. In addition, a court has a
duty to respond to every complaint brought before it if the issue is
properly presented.
Having argued the case that courts are the best available institution
to scrutinize specific decisions which effect the environment, Professor
Sax criticizes current legal principles and standards of judicial review.
The two major barriers to effective judicial supervision of administrative
decision-making are the lack of a theory of public rights to a decent
environment' and "the administrative-review syndrome of crabbed in-
quiries . . ."' into low visability decisions. These are valid criticisms.
The major flaw in the book is the breadth of his suggested remedies. At
many points in the book he argues for review of the merits of environ-
mental controversies,' although at other points the author seems to draw
back from the implications of this position and suggests an expanded role
for courts in private suits characterized by traditional theories of judicial
restraint.
The author's thesis is that "[t]he principal function of courts in
environmental matters is to restrain projects that have not been ade-
quately planned and to insist that they not go forward unless and until
those who wish to promote them can demonstrate that they have
considered, and adequately resolved, reasonable doubts about their con-
2. Sax at 64.
3. Sax at 109.
4. This is also the major weakness of reliance on the judiciary because the re-
sources to mount a law suit must be mobilized before a cQurt can intervene. W. GELL-
HORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 25 (1966).
5. Sax at 160.
6. Sax at 148.
7. E.g., Sax at 149.
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sequences." 8 This proposal suggests that the function of the courts is
only to improve the planning and decision-making process by insuring
an adequate consideration of the costs and benefits of a project as
evidenced by the record presented by the agency rather than to make
a decision on the merits of a project. This theory of judicial intervention
is a synthesis and expansion of the principles developed primarily by
the Second and District of Columbia Circuits and such state courts
as Massachusetts and New Jersey. Starting with the now famous
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC the courts have been
controlling decision-making by agencies with broad mandates to approve
or to undertake projects in the public interest by requiring a fuller
administrative record than has been customary in the past. This approach
was adopted by Congress in the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (N.E.P.A.)." ° To sustain a decision a record must demonstrate
that all potential environmentally-detrimental side effects of a project
have been identified and that alternative means of achieving the statutory
objective under which the project is authorized-including not con-
structing the project"-have been considered. The basic problem of
technology and development assessment is that those who favor a
project have the resources to be heard. Thus, there is a substantial danger
that the benefits of a proposed activity will be systematically overestimated
and the costs similarly underestimated. To counteract this problem, the
courts and now N.E.P.A. require the fullest possible social accounting.
Professor Sax would, however, go beyond these theories of judicial
intervention. He argues that courts should go further and remand
decisions to the legislature-thus bypassing the administrative process
-"if the court finds the proposal at odds with an environmentally
sound policy, though it may not be expressed in any legislation . . .""
As Professor Jaffe suggests, Sax may either be arguing "that the judge
should himself perform the balancing which normally would be the
function of the agency, or he may be saying that where there is a
serious envronmental impact the balancing is to be done by the legisla-
ture."' 3 Support for both positions can be found in the book but the
latter interpretation is more probable because Professor Sax places his
8. Sax at 113.
9. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). The most com-
plete statement of the "new" judicial review is Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckels-
haus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
11. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
12. Sax at 152.
13. Jaffe, Book Review, 84 HARv. L. Rv. 1562, 1566 (1971).
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ultimate faith in a democratized legislature. This is not the place to
explore at length the merits of this belief but the experience of Congress
with technology assessment suggests that except in such major con-
troversies as the SST, legislatures are not the best forums to consider
specific technological controversies.
Scenic Hudson and its progency are essentially modifications of the
burden of proof requirements, and they do not require a court to reach
the merits of a controversy. Consistent with our growing and widespread
recognition of the potential adverse side-effect of the wide-scale applica-
tion of technology, courts are now placing the burden on the initiator
of development rather than on the objector, as was the case during the
nineteenth century. Courts have a large and creative role to play in
improving the process by which decisions are taken through a manipula-
tion of the burden of proof requirements (more properly the burden of
justification). In addition to shifting the burden of justification, the
courts can make a more searching inquiry into the scope of authority
delegated by the legislature by refusing to conclude automatically that
the legislative purpose is expressed in a single enabling statute. Often
legislative policy toward a specific problem will be found in a maze of
conflicting statutes and the task of the court is to attempt to knit them
together. A court has a number of techniques available to it, short of
making a decision on the merits, when faced with an environmentally
questionable proposal. Statutes which seem to express a conflicting
purpose can be used to shift the burden of justification to the initiator.14
Doubts about clear legislative authorization can be resolved against the
initiator. 5 If a project must obtain approval from several agencies the
court can resist efforts to expedite the project by finding either pre-
emption or that the legislature has delegated exclusive authority to one
agency." Requiring the project to obtain approval from several agencies
enourages more comprehensive review and legislative reconsideration of
the problem.
14. The New Jersey Supreme Court did this in Texas E. Transmission Co. v. Wild-
life Preserves, 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966), discussed in chapter 10. A private
wildlife refuge contested a route selected by a pipeline company. Relying in part on
federal and state legislation encouraging wildlife preserves, the court held that if the
refuge introduced evidence of serious damage and the existence of reasonable alternative
routes, a prima facie case of arbitrariness would be established and the burden of going
forward would shift to the pipeline company.
15. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966),
discussed in chapter 7.
16. Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d
945, 95 Cal. Rptr. 17, 484 P.2d 1361 (1971), held that a utility must obtain approval
from both a local air pollution control district and the public utilities commission to con-
struct a steam electric generating plant.
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The foundation for Professor Sax's proposal for review on the
merits is "the rejection of the expertise of administrative agencies in
the resolution of important environmental disputes. Succinctly stated, it
is believed that in any environmental controversy involving the weighing
of conflicting values, the weigher should be a court, a generalist, rather
than an administrative agency whose outlook is organically developmental
and provincial."'" Senator Philip Hart of Michigan has introduced
legislation to implement the theory by allowing courts to create a federal
environmental common law ranging from project location controversies
to suits to enjoin pollution. 8 But Professor Sax's theories of judicial
review are developed primarily from highway location cases and serious
problems are raised when an attempt is made to apply them to all other
environmental controversies, especially pollution abatement.
The reasons differ for permitting suits against such government
agencies as the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Forest Service
and Department of Transportation and for permitting citizen pollution
suits to supplant administrative regulation. The purpose of litigation in
the first instance is to correct federal programs which give insufficient
weight to environmental considerations. This reasoning, however, does
not apply as readily to the activities of agencies whose primary mission
is the development of environmental standards. 9 The integrity of an
administrative enforcement program may be undermined if a judge has
the power to reject the standards promulgated by an agency. Further
disincentives for industry to comply are created by the threat of a law
suit based on the grounds that compliance with administrative standards
can still constitute pollution. This is not to argue that pollution agencies
should be free from judicial scrutiny. For example, compliance with
standards should not be a per se defense to a private nuisance action. I
argue only that these agencies should have the discretion to deal with
complex problems free from the threat of judicial rejection of their
standards in a citizen's suit where a court is free to substitute its judgment
for the agency's.
2 0
17. Sive, The Role of Litigation in Environmental Policy: The Power Plant Siting
Problem, 11 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 467, 471 (1971).
18. S. 1032, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
19. Professor Sax would not agree:
So much in the real planning process is done by informal conversation and
consultation, and there is a kind of wishfulness in feeling that by legal rules or
institutional manipulation the "insider perspective" can be reformed and legis-
lated into that all-embracing public interest perspective which is our ideal.
Sax at 102.
20. The counter argument is made in Hearing on S. 1032 Before the Subconint. on
the Environment of the Senate Commerce Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 43-57 (1971), and
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The constitutional problems of courts exercising the powers Professor
Sax urges alone suggest that in the long run the best hope for a
systematic strategy for arresting environmental degradation lies with
restructuring administrative agencies.21 N.E.P.A. has only made a start
and the extreme judicial role projected by the book may hinder accom-
plishment of this objective by deflecting attention away from the less
dramatic but more fundamental reforms by giving lhwyers and the
public a sense of satisfaction that something major has been done when
in fact it has not. Defending the Environment does not deal adequately
with the tension between the legal approach to the problems involved in
environmental controversies and that of the scientific and technical pro-
fessions. At the present time lawyers are approaching environmental
problems through the traditional formulas of standard setting and law
suits but it is likely that in the future power will flow from lawyers to
the technical professions because the technicians have the capacity to
take a more integrated view of the problems. Standards are increasingly
unsuccessful not primarily because of lax enforcement-although this is,
of course, a real problem-but becaue of insufficient scientific and
engineering understanding of the issues and alternatives. For example,
"[t]he Environmental Protection Agency, initially oriented toward
lawyer directed regulation and control, and eager to make an initial
impression upon industry and the public, has been discovering that it
may not in many cases have the necessary scientific or technical support
to make its directives 'stick'."22 Lawsuits can sharpen the issues and
question the factual basis for this assertion, but they cannot supply the
missing information. Technicians cannot, of course, tell us how high our
environmental quality should be. They can define the consequences of
adopting alternative limits on environmental degradation but the ultimate
answer to the question "how much?" must come through the political
process. Few would dispute the proposition that we must change existing
patterns of resource use to upgrade the quality of the environment because
the important issue of today is to determine the best institutional approach
to achieve this objective. The problem with Defending the Environment
is that Professor Sax has overestimated the merits of shifting the resolu-
tion of environmental conflicts from administrative to judicial forums.
The weakness of Professor Sax's expanded theory of judicial
in Hearings on S. 3575 Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Natural Resources, and the En-
vironnient of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38-41 (1970). The
current version of the bill is S. 1032, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
21. Jaffe, Book Review, supra note 13, at 1567-68.
22. 2 ENVIRONMENTAL RE'OT 79 (1971).
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intervention is illustrated by his proposals for a common law theory of
public environmental rights. Most environmental controversies are not
susceptible to being reduced to a consistent right-duty relationship
between citizens and public agencies, as he recognizes in a brief discus-
sion of the limits of the legislature's ability to set standards which deter-
mine the outcome of specific controversies.2" As precedent for a theory of
public environmental rights, he turns to the old navigable waters doctrine
-the public trust-which governs the ownership and use of the beds of
tide and submerged lands. The author argues that if the doctrine is
read broadly "its underlying concept is readily adaptable to the whole
range of issues that comprise our environmental dilemma "24
Specifically, he finds the doctrine contains three general principles:
First, that certain interests-like air and the sea-have such
importance to the citizenry as a whole that it would be unwise
to make them the subject of private ownership. Second, that
they partake so much of the bounty of nature, rather than of
individual enterprise, they they should be made freely available
to the entire citizenry without regard to economic status. And,
finally, that it is a principle purpose of government to promote
the interests of the general public rather than to redistribute
public goods from public uses to restricted private benefit.2"
His three principles cannot be derived from the doctrine for it cannot
answer the crucial question: what level of environmental quality should
be maintained. Also, except in a few extreme situations the doctrine has
very little to say about the distribution of the benefits of these resources.
The public trust theory, which expresses one simple idea, is not a
general theory of resource allocation. The core concept is that "[t]he
claim of citizens and inhabitants of a state or country to the free use of
the waters of the sea and their shores [for navigation], for private
advantage, is so obviously dictated by the law of nature, that in the first
ages of all countries, they have been left open to public use." 6 The public
trust works because custom supplies a limited set of standards which
courts can apply to specific controversies. The doctrine does not prohibit
government disposition or use of trust lands so long as public rights are
23. Sax at 234.
24. Sax at 172.
25. Sax at 165.
26. J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS 17 (2.
ed. 1847).
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protected. 7 It has not hindered legislative or administrative decisions to
sever lands from the trust and thus free them from public rights" except
in cases where use of an entire harbor or segment of coastline would be
foreclosed." In the nineteenth century vague and contradictory land
grant legislation sometimes provided the basis for extravagent private
claims to large tracts of coastal and harbor lands. To protect public
rights of navigation courts applied a rule of strict construction to in-
validate private grants.20 The trust does, as Professor Sax argues,
contain a theory of close judicial scrutiny of public resource disposition
applicable to a wide range of decisions, but, as he recognizes, it provides
no standards for a court to decide that any but extreme attempts to use
natural resources violate public rights. He correctly argues that trust
rights are not analogous to first amendment constitutional rights because
the problem in the trust cases is that the "will" of a diffuse majority has
been subject to the "will" of a concerted minority. Instead he views trust
rights as an adaptation of the old maxim of equity sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedes.3' The problem with a common law nuisance analogy is that
a landowner's expectation that his enjoyment of his land will not be
foreclosed by the use made of surrounding land is significantly greater
than a citizen's expectations to use common resources such as airsheds,
river basins and scenic corridors. The expectations of a landowner are
greater because the competing claims are greater 2 and more trade-offs
must follow.3 A court can decide that A's land cannot be used as a sink
but should it question the conscious choice to use the waste assimilation
capacity of a stream on the grounds that it is the most efficient method of
treating a particular series of waste discharges? I would answer that it
should not, although proposed legislation drafted by Professor Sax
27. E.g., Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928). (State may lease
tidelands for extraction of oil).
28. Knudson v. Kearney, 171 Cal. 250, 152 P. 541 (1915). See also City of Long
Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal.3d 462, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 476 P. 2d 423 (1970).
29. The leading case is Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
30. See, e.g., People ex rel. Pierce v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336 (1864).
31. Sax at 158-59.
32. Hanks & Hanks, The Right to a Habitable Emirownent, in THE RIGHTS OF
AMuRICANS 146, 149-54 (N. Dorsen ed. 1970).
33. Pollution problems involve trade-offs between sources of pollution. For ex-
ample, Pittsburgh cleaned up its air by dumping its residuals in the Ohio River. Thus,
a judicial decision which required a company to stop its air pollution might create a more
severe water or solid waste disposal problem. On balance, it would seem that a basin or
regional agency would have a better chance of avoiding these problems through the
development of a coordinated approach to the recycling of residuals. See A. KNEESE, R.
AYRas & R. D'ARGE, EcoNoMlICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1970) ; Jaffe, The Administra-
tive Agency and Environmental Control, 20 BuFFALO L. IRv. 231, 235 (1970).
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would seem to allow a court to consider this question.34
In order for a claim to be classified as a right, there must be a
consensus-generally through custom or legislation-that in a given
range of conflicts, the claim should be given priority. No such con-
sensus exists with respect to environmental claims. In the absence of
administratively imposed standards or damage that would support a
public or private nuisance action, a court has no basis to determine that
an activity such as a highway or discharge from a power plant should
not take place, whereas it can mandate a broadened perspective on the
part of decision-makers. Environmental conflicts are disputes over the
allocation of natural resources and should be solved by an elaborate
accounting effort which includes substantial public participation at crucial
stages of the decision-making process. Costs and benefits must be esti-
mated and where they cannot be, the costs of alternatives and the oppor-
tunity cost of preservation of the resource in its existing condition are cal-
culated. Risks need to be defined so that the consequences of trade-offs can
be estimated. In the end of a choice must be made and no general theory of
public rights can state a principle to guide a court. Judicial intervention
can improve the process by which a decision is reached but it cannot and
should not decide the merits of the issue. As I have mentioned, the
theory of separation of powers precludes a court from making this kind
of judgment when the legislature has clearly delegated the authority
to an administrative agency. This may, however, be an unfair criticism
of the book's argument. The examples of the possible use of the public
trust doctrine he gives suggest that it is basically a rationale for a common
law theory to give members of the public standing to object to activities
which threaten the environment. This is needed. Combined with a
liberalized theory of standing, the techniques of statutory construction
discussed earlier and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
should be a sufficient basis for citizen's suits to contest the location or
desirability of such large-scale projects as highways, power plants and
timber harvesting and thus the potential problems of an expanded theory
of trust rights are avoided.
34. Section 4(a) of S. 1032 provides that any citizen may bring an action for
declaratory relief upon a showing that an activity may result in "unreasonable pollution,
impairment, or destruction of the air, water, land or public trust of the United
States . . ." The defendant then has the burden of establishing that there is no feasible
and prudent alternative and "that the activity at issue is consistent with and reasonably
required for promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare in light of the paramount
concern of the United States for the protection of its air, water, land, and public trust
from unreasonable pollution, impairment, or destruction."
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A more fruitful approach to defining public rights to a decent
environment in airsheds and river basins has been suggested by a
University of Toronto political economist, John H. Dales.8" An admin-
istrative body would be delegated the task of establishing region-wide
environmental ceilings on the use of common resources based on ecological
and economic information. The number of tons of waste that could be
discharged within the ceiling would then be calculated and those wish-
ing to discharge would buy the necessary rights from the public. Those
who wished to preserve resources could also buy rights in order to
foreclose other uses. Citizen suits should be allowed to enjoin users who
discharge in excess of the rights they have purchased.
No one can dispute the failure of the administrative process to
prevent environmental deterioration. Defending the Environment is a
well written, perceptive account of why the process has failed. It is a
call to action but, unlike most polemical wrting, it is balanced. Professor
Sax carefully constructs his arguments, deals candidly with possible
objections to them and is aware of the limitations of judicial action.
Although I disagree with some of the implications of his proposals, his
basic goal "to create additional leverage for the citizen-to add to, not
diminish, the opportunities for rederess; to improve and provoke the
democratic process, not to constrain it," is one that all lawyers should
support." On the whole, Defending the Environment is a realistic
strategy for needed increased judicial intervention in the administrative
process and one can trust the courts to temper it as they put this creative
book to use.
A. DAN TARLoCKt
35. J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES (1968). Professor Sax does agree
that a system of effluent charges is preferable to a series of private law suits to control
conventional air and water pollution. Sax at 121.
36. Sax at 239 (emphasis added).
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University.
